Abstract-Governments around the world are reforming their social security systems in light of the challenges posed by population aging. We study the 1993 Australian Age Pension reform, which progressively increased the eligibility age for women from 60 to 65 years. We find economically significant responses to the reform. An increase in the eligibility age of one year induced a decline in the probability of retirement by 12 to 19 percentage points. In addition, the reform induced significant program substitution, with increases in enrollment in other social insurance programs, particularly the disability support pension, which effectively functioned as an alternative source of retirement income.
I. Introduction
P OPULATION aging poses an important challenge to the fiscal sustainability of social security systems around the world. In addressing these challenges, governments continue to implement reforms to their social security programs. Restructuring the pension system, changing the level of benefit payments, and tightening access such as by increasing the eligibility age are common examples of recent reforms. As the baby boom generation begins making the transition to retirement, it is increasingly urgent that the effects of these reforms be assessed to provide an evidence base for future policy development.
When the Australian government embarked on age pension reform in 1993, one explicit goal was to increase the labor force participation of older workers. The reform increased the eligibility age for women to access age pension benefits. The change to the age pension eligibility age (APA) represents a reduction in social security wealth and provides an ideal natural experiment to study the incentive effects of the age pension program. We use this policy experiment to investigate two issues: (a) to what extent this policy reform contributed to an increase in the labor force participation of women and (b) the degree to which the reform had an unintended side effect of inducing participation in alternative government programs, especially the disability support pension.
The literature on the incentive effects of social security shows that workers' retirement decisions are influenced through two main channels. The first is by directly changing the lifetime income or expected wealth of an individual. If the program benefit exceeds the individual's contribution to the program, the existence of the program increases the lifetime income of the individual and therefore reduces the labor supply of the individual on the assumption that leisure is a normal good. This is known as the wealth effect of the program. The second channel operates when social security benefits increase with contributory earnings. In this case, an extra year of work also increases the future stream of expected social security benefits. When considering the optimal timing of retirement, workers will take account of the effect of an extra year of work on the level of retirement income once retired, an effect known as the accrual effect. When there is an increase in the eligibility age of the programs, the wealth and accrual effects work in the same direction, with both tending to induce later retirement, and as a consequence, it is difficult to disentangle the separate influence of each on retirement choices.
A distinctive feature of the Australian age pension program is that is a noncontributory scheme; eligibility does not require prior employment, and the benefit levels are not conditional on prior earnings. Because pension benefits in Australia are independent of prior earnings, the accrual effect of continued employment on social security wealth is absent. The effect of the age pension on labor supply operates through the wealth effect only. This makes the Australian experiment uniquely clean and transparent for studying the pure wealth effect, as comparable reforms in other industrial economies need to model potentially strong accrual effects.
The key challenge in the empirical literature is to find a substantial and plausibly exogenous variation in the social security system to identify and gauge the behavioral impacts of public pensions. Most empirical studies attempting to estimate the effect of social security incentives on retirement are based on cross-sectional variation. These studies, summarized in the detailed surveys by Coile and Gruber (2007) and Chan and Stevens (2004) , typically find strong effects of social security incentives on the retirement decision. A limitation with this approach is that since the social security program is the same for everyone at a point in time, identification may be undermined by the correlation between program incentives and retirement preferences. Therefore it is very difficult to reliably disentangle the effect of social security parameters from differences in preferences across individuals or general trends in retirement and benefit levels over time.
One potential solution is to use a natural experiment and study the retirement decisions around actual social security reforms. The advantage of this approach is that the policy reforms generate exogenous variation in benefits within similar groups of people. Moreover, if a suitable control group can be identified and used to control for general time effects under a common trends assumption, this approach 72 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS can isolate the behavioral impact of the change in social security rules. A well-known example of this approach is Krueger and Pischke (1992) , who investigate the change to U.S. social security provisions in 1977. In contrast to many other cross-sectional studies, Krueger and Pischke find a weak relationship between social security wealth and labor supply. Mastrobuoni (2009) studies the effects of a recent benefit cut, arising from the increase in the normal retirement age (NRA) in the United States on retirement behavior. He compares the labor force behavior of treated cohorts with earlier cohorts that were not affected by the increase in the NRA. Mastrobuoni finds a substantial impact of the reform on retirement behavior. He also highlights another advantage of the natural experiment methodology as providing an ex post evaluation of the policy change and argues that simulation studies that rely on out-of-sample projections may be inadequate because they may fail to account for possible behavioral effects associated with social norms (see Duflo & Saez, 2003) . Hanel and Riphahn (2012) investigate the Swiss pension reform, which affected the normal retirement age for women, and they find a strong effect on female employment similar in magnitude to that found in Mastrobuoni (2009) . Note that these papers examine reforms that have potentially strong accrual effects. Gruber and Wise (2004) and Samwick (1998) argue that the accrual effect is the main source driving changes in retirement behavior from such reforms. Therefore, these papers may not reliably distinguish separate wealth and accrual effects.
Another strand of the literature uses the exogenous variation in benefits to study the interaction of different social insurance programs. Reforms that reduce the relative generosity of pensions provide incentives for individuals to seek benefits from other social insurance programs. Several studies try to quantify the magnitude of such spillover effects. Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007) consider the same U.S. reform as does Mastrobuoni (2009) and find that the increase in NRA increased the disability insurance beneficiary rate; Li and Maestas (2008) , Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer (2010) , and Coe and Haverstick (2010) also examine program substitution effects stemming from pension reforms.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on public pension incentive effects by exploiting the recent policy experiment in Australia, where the institutional features of the program allow us to isolate the pure wealth effect. We have two important findings. First, we show that the rise in the eligibility age of the Australian age pension increased elderly female labor supply by approximately 12 to 19 percentage points. This behavioral response is smaller than the recent findings for the United States, which may be explained by a combination of life cycle wealth effects, changing norms, and takeup of alternative public benefits. Second, we show that the policy reform had significant spillover effects on other social insurance programs; the rise in the eligibility age of the age pension led to a substantial increase in the enrollment in the disability support pension, which effectively provided an alternative source of retirement income.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the Australian pension system and details the recent policy reform that is the focus of our analysis. In section III, key aspects of the data are outlined, and the recent trends in the Australian labour market are summarized. Section IV explains our empirical methodology, and section V presents the results. Section VI provides concluding comments.
II. Australian Program Reform
The Australian retirement income system is based on three pillars: a means-tested public pension, a mandatory employer-contributed private retirement savings account, and voluntary private retirement savings. In Australia there is no compulsory retirement age, and elderly Australians can supplement their retirement income through continued employment.
The Australian first pillar program, known as the age pension, was introduced in 1908. Its primary objective was to alleviate the high incidence of poverty among the elderly. From its inception, the age pension has been a targeted program subject to a means test based on income and assets. Initially the means test was relatively strict, with only 30% of the elderly population receiving benefits. As the means test was relaxed over time, the participation rate increased, peaking at over 85% in the 1980s. In June 2010, 69% of the elderly population received age pension benefits, which constituted the main source of income for a majority of beneficiaries.
The maximum benefit payment from the age pension is set at 25% of male total average earnings, plus a supplement to compensate for the introduction of the good and service tax in 2000. As at July 1, 2008, near the end of our observation period, the maximum age pension benefit was AUD$546.80 per fortnight for individuals or AUD$913.60 (combined) per couple. 1 This maximum benefit is subject to an income and assets test. The income test is based on a threshold ("income disregard") of $138 ($240) per fortnight for singles (couples), above which benefits are reduced by 40 cents (20 cents) for each dollar of income. The asset test depends on the home ownership status of the applicant. For home owners, the threshold ("asset disregard") is $171,750 ($243,500) for singles (couples), and for non-homeowners, the asset disregard is $296,500 ($368,000) for singles (couples). Pension benefits are reduced by $1.50 per fortnight for every $1,000 in excess of the asset disregard. In 2008, twothirds of all age pension recipients received the maximum pension payment. 2 Eligibility for the age pension is subject to residency and age conditions. Individuals need to have been resident in Australia for at least ten years. There are different 1 Benefit levels and the means test thresholds are adjusted every six months in line with changes in the consumer price index or average (ordinary time) male earnings-whichever is greater. Recipients also receive subsidies for health care, pharmaceuticals, public transport, utilities, and private rental assistance.
2 For detailed information on the benefit structure, see Barrett and Tseng (2008) . age requirements for male and female applicants. The age pension qualifying age for men has always been 65 years. The qualifying age for women has undergone a gradual increase since 1995, from the initial 60 years of age to the age requirement of 65 years in 2014; this is the exogenous variation in social security wealth we exploit in this study.
In assessing the impacts of the age pension reform, the analysis considers participation in other public assistance programs. For the target population, the most important alternative program is the disability support pension (DSP). Like the age pension and unlike disability insurance programs in other countries, the Australian DSP program is noncontributory, and eligibility is not tied to prior work history. The DSP benefit rate and means test is the same as that for the age pension. To qualify for DSP, an individual must be (a) under age pension age; (b) assessed as having severe physical, intellectual, or psychological impairment; and (c) unable to work at least fifteen hours per week within two years. A DSP recipient is automatically transferred to the age pension on becoming age eligible. Subject to being assessed as having a significant long-term incapacity for work, the DSP program represents a potential substitute form of income support for individuals affected by the age pension reform.
A. Raising the Qualifying Age for the Age Pension
When the Invalid and Old Age Pensions Act 1908 came into effect, the age pension was payable to both men and women at 65 years of age. In 1910, the qualifying age for women was reduced to 60 years, and the qualifying age for both men and women then remained unchanged for the next 85 years. The Social Security Legislation Amendment Act 1993 announced that the qualifying age for women would progressively increase from July 1, 1995, and would be equal to the male eligibility age of 65 years by 2014. As shown in table 1, the age pension eligibility age for women increased by six months every two calendar years from mid-1995. Table 1 shows that the progressive increase in the APA did not affect women born before July 1, 1935; for women born after this date, the qualifying age progressively increased by six months for each subsequent eighteen-month birth cohort.
The eligibility age will reach 65 years for women born after January 1, 1949. 3 This reform to the Australian social security system represents an unambiguous decline in the social security wealth of women. Each six-month delay in the receipt of age pension benefits represents approximately a 2.5% reduction in the discounted present value of expected social security wealth. 4 For the post-January 1949 birth cohort, who face an APA of 65 years, their expected social security wealth is effectively 23% less than that of a member of the pre-July 1935 birth cohort. Therefore, this reform to the age pension represents a substantial exogenous change in social security wealth.
The decline in social security wealth is expected to lead to an adjustment in the timing of retirement. The effect of the pension reform can be demonstrated with a simple life cycle model, such as that presented in Burbidge and Robb (1980) . Assume that the lifetime utility of an individual is given by
where V is the value of lifetime utility discounted with the rate of time preference δ. Assume an individual has T years to live and R is the age of retirement, so that an individual works R years and spends (T − R) years in retirement. The felicity function is defined over consumption and leisure U(C t , L t ). For simplicity, assume retirement is a discrete decision, normalized to 0 when working and 1 during retirement; leisure is then varied only by the retirement decision, R. Let 
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The budget constraint in equation (2) shows that the total discounted value of consumption at interest rate r must equal the income from three sources: the total discounted value of labor income (Y t ), the discounted value of private retirement savings P(R), and age pension wealth AP t , which is conditional on t q , the age at which a person qualifies for the pension benefit. 5 For simplicity, assume individuals can borrow or save at the market interest rate r, and let δ = r. The first-order conditions for the individual's optimization problem are
Condition (3) states that marginal utility of consumption in retirement and while working are equal, and in turn will be equal to the Lagrange multiplier μ on the lifetime budget constraint, which corresponds to the marginal utility of wealth. Rearranging condition (4) gives
the left-hand side of which is the marginal utility of one more year of retirement relative to the marginal utility of consumption. This is the marginal rate of substitution between retirement and consumption. The right-hand side of equation (5) is the slope of the budget constraint, which represents the individual's market opportunities for trading off one more year of full leisure in retirement against the decrease in the total working lifetime earnings and private pension income. Note that the age-conditioned public pension AP t does not affect the marginal rate of substitution or the tangency condition for the optimal solution. The unique features of the Australian age pension program, where benefits are not a function of prior earnings and there is no accrual of additional benefits with delayed retirement, means that a change in the qualifying age is equivalent to a change to total age pension wealth This model of the impact of age pension on retirement contains important simplifications. First, the model does not include the age pension means test. High-income or highwealth individuals do not qualify for age pension benefits, and the increase in qualifying age represents a nonbinding 5 The age pension benefit is age conditioned since benefit payments begin at a specific age and are independent of labor force status and prior earnings.
constraint. For this group, the reform is predicted to have no impact on retirement choices. The role of the means test is incorporated into the empirical analysis of the reform impact. Second, liquidity constraints may limit individuals' ability to move resources through time. An inability to borrow against future expected SSW suggests that the age pension reform is likely to have a stronger impact on low-wealth individuals. Third, the model does not take account of the multiple programs that compose the social safety net. The negative wealth effect of the age pension reform provides an incentive for the affected women to enroll in other government programs that offer income replacement and an alternative pathway to retirement. 6 Further, the change in eligibility age may influence social norms concerning retirement if individuals perceive the legislated eligibility age as a target retirement age. This effect has been presented as a possible explanation of the increase in retirement propensities at focal ages, such as the early retirement age, defined in social security program rules (Lumsdaine & Mitchell, 1999) . In the next section, we introduce the data with which we quantify these effects.
III. Data and Empirical Methods

A. Sample Construction
Our empirical analysis is based on eleven cross sections (1994/95 to 2009/10) of the nationally representative Australian Bureau of Statistics Income and Housing Costs Surveys (IHCS). The IHCS were conducted on a sample of dwellings throughout Australia during a given fiscal (JulyJune) year. As a result, the surveys overlap seventeen calendar years from 1994 to 2010. 7 The IHCS are a rich data source containing detailed information on individual demographic characteristics, labor supply, earnings, and income for each member of the household aged 15 years and over. Pooling the cross-sectional surveys provides a relatively large sample of observations on individuals in the target age range of 60 to 64 years, on which the analysis is focused.
A limitation of the IHCS data for our purpose is the lack of information on exact birthdate. The data contain information on the quarter of the interview and the individual's age at the time of the interview. Subtracting age from year and quarter of the interview provides a fifteen-month window in which the birthdate of the individual falls. As a result, when we assign treatment group status based on the birth year, there is potential misclassification. In the empirical section, we discuss this issue further and explicitly incorporate the misclassification probability into the estimation.
The main variable of interest in the analysis is the retirement status of individuals. The IHCS data contain a variable indicating labor force status at the time of the interview. We classify people who report their current status as "not in the labor force" as retired and the remainder as participating in the labor force. There is detailed information on income sources, such as government transfers with categories including the age pension and the disability support pension, plus a range of additional programs. This information is used in the analysis of program substitution effects.
The main sample analyzed is composed of individuals aged 60 to 64 years. 8 This restricts the sample to individuals born between 1930 and 1950. The sample represents the set of individuals at risk of retirement and most likely affected by the age pension reform. The sample also contains birth cohorts that were not affected by the age pension reform by virtue of being born before July 1935, which represent one potential control group. The main sample for the analysis contains observations on 5,822 women and 5,587 men. For part of the analysis, we concentrate on single individuals; this sample contains observations on 1,722 women and 1,087 men. Table  2 presents summary statistics for the full sample and the subset of single adults by birth cohort. The cohorts are similar in terms of marital status and household size, though more recent cohorts have higher educational attainment. Comparing males and females shows that, in each cohort, a higher percentage of males are married and have a bachelor's degree. The difference in educational attainment between males and females is less for more recent cohorts.
Turning to retirement trends, figure 1 depicts the labor force participation rates over time for men and women in Australia aged 60 to 64 years. The solid lines plot aggregate time 8 We excluded immigrants who arrived in Australia less than ten years from the date of interview. These individuals are not eligible to receive age pension benefits due to the residency requirement. This represents less than 1% of the overall sample. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these observations. series data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Labour Force Survey, and the gray lines (with the X indicating each survey) plot our calculations based on the IHCS data. It is clear that our pooled sample replicates the macrotrends in the aggregate data series. Figure 1 shows that participation rates of older women in Australia have increased substantially in the past two decades. Since the mid-1980s, participation rates of women aged 60 to 64 increased by almost 30 percentage points, whereas older male participation rates declined over the 1970s and 1980s, before increasing through the 1990s, when they exhibited a trend parallel to women's labor force participation. Similar trends in the participation rates of elder men and women are to some extent observed in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and several other European countries. To investigate the importance of cohort difference, we divide the IHCS data into birth cohorts. Figure 2 shows the participation rates by age for each birth cohort of men and women.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
It is evident from figure 2 that participation rates of more recent cohorts of women are substantially higher than prior cohorts. These clear gaps may be a product of differences in cohort characteristics, such as education levels, 9 changes in labor demand conditions, or the increases in age pension qualifying age. Another important trend evident in figure 2 is that in contrast to trends observed for the female cohorts, there are no differences in the participation-age profiles across the male birth cohorts. This observation, in conjunction with the fact that men and women exhibited similar aggregate trends in participation over the observation period, supports the use of the male group as a control group for investigating the impact of age pension rules on female labor force participation. Figure 3 shows participation rates by age for each birth cohort by marital status. Several studies have documented a strong correlation in the timing of spouses' retirement. As a result, one challenge to using men as a control group is the assumption that the pension reform has no spillover effects on married men. Figure 3 shows that even when we restrict the sample to single individuals, we still observe cohort differences among women but not men. The cost of restricting our sample to singles is the reduction in sample size. 10 Nevertheless, we perform the empirical analysis first using the full sample, and then for the subsample of single adults as a robustness check.
In figures 4 and 5 we plot participation rates in different government programs by birth cohort. For women we plot four different categories, with the first showing the percentage of women who receive benefits from any government program, including the age pension. As expected, participation rates are decreasing for more recent birth cohorts coincident with the increase in their labor force participation and age 9 Although summary statistics show that the educational attainment of adjacent cohorts are not substantially different from each other. 10 For some birth cohorts, we end up with fewer than fifty observations. pension disentitlement; this cohort discontinuity is especially pronounced over ages 60 to 64 years, the ages affected by the age pension reform. In panel b of figure 4, the age pension is excluded from the set of government programs. In contrast to panel a, this shows that participation rates in other income support programs for recent cohorts are substantially greater than for prior cohorts, specifically at ages 60 to 64 years. Panel c of figure 4 compares the participation rates for the disability support pension by cohort which, similar to panel b, shows an upward trend in participation among more recent birth cohorts. Panel d illustrates the differences in age pension participation rates by age across birth cohorts, directly reflecting the impact of the APA reform. For men, shown in figure 5 , we see no cohort differences in participation for all government programs collectively or specifically the disability support pension. 11 Thus, these enrollment trends for women aged 60 to 64 strongly suggest that the age pension reform led to program substitution.
B. Empirical Methods
The variation in APA for women compared to the constant APA for men of the same birth cohort provides a natural experiment for examining the impact of the APA policy parameter on labor force behavior. The identification strategy exploits the exogenous variation in APA by implementing a difference-in-difference empirical model. This strategy compares the changes in the labor supply outcomes of the female cohorts (treatment groups) with the male cohorts (control group) under the assumption that in the absence of the age pension reform, the two cohorts would have experienced the same change in their labor supply. The before and after demarcation is aligned with the July 1, 1935, cohort birthdate. We also take account of multiple treatments, or differing treatment intensities, due to the ratcheting up of eligibility age for more recent cohorts. There are several concerns with using the difference-in-difference estimator in this context. First, our treatment and the control group may differ in time trends of observable characteristics. As Meyer (1995) notes, the bias that arises from the differential change in observable variables can be reduced through using the regression-adjusted difference-in-difference methodology by conditioning on additional explanatory variables. This also provides an efficiency improvement compared to the simple difference-in-difference strategy. Thus, we employ the augmented difference-in-difference strategy.
Second, within-family spillover effects may impart bias if the retirement decisions of spouses are interdependent. Men who are married to women in the affected cohorts may also face different incentives that may bear on their retirement decision. We consider the restricted sample of single men and women to assess the robustness of the results to potential within-family spillover effects. A final concern is whether male cohorts constitute a suitable comparison group. This concern is that men may have experienced different time trends or changes in institutional regimes relative to women. As can be seen from figure 2, throughout our sample period, male and female groups exhibited similar aggregate trends in labor force participation; furthermore, the age participation profiles in figure 3 show comparable parallel trends by cohort. This reduces the concern regarding differential time trends. With respect to differences in policy regimes, apart from the APA change, there were no social security or labor regulation changes that affected the 60-64 age group differentially for men and women during the sample period. Nevertheless, as an alternative strategy, we use a similar methodology to Mastrobuoni (2009) and investigate the cohort differences of male and female groups separately, with the pre-July 1935 cohort forming the control group. Although this strategy is not based on a male-female comparison, 12 it is more restrictive in terms of separating general time effects from the impact of the APA reform. We estimate a linear probability model for an individual's binary choice of whether to participate in the labor force. 13 The model specification is based on
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where labor force participation (LFP i ) is an indicator variable that equals 0 if individual i is retired and 1 if the individual participates in the labor force. The vector x i is a set of control variables that includes age, education, marital status, state of residence dummies, and household size. The indicator variable Female i is equal to 1 for women, who constitute the treatment group. Differences in labor supply preferences of the treatment and control group are represented by the coefficient α 0 , which we expect to be negative given that women on average have lower lifetime labor force participation than men. The birth cohort indicator variable CohortA i is equal to 1 if an individual was born after June 1935, and 0 otherwise. 14 To assess the impact of the pension reform, we test whether affected cohorts of women increased their labor force participation relative to cohorts of men. The interaction term Female i × CohortA i captures the treatment effect; we expect to the coefficient δ to have a positive sign.
As mentioned above, due to the lack of an exact birthdate variable in our data, the eighteen-month birth cohorts indicator variables are subject to misclassification error. For each individual, subtracting age in years from the date of interview gives a fifteen-month window for date of birth. Assuming that "quarters of birth" is uniformly distributed over a year gives us a known probability of misclassification that we can take into account in the estimation. 15 Following Mastrobuoni (2009), equation (6) can be modified as
where the cohort indicator is replaced by the probability that a given individual belongs to the birth cohort affected by the reform. 16 Since the magnitude of the treatment varies by cohort, it is useful to extend the model specification by allowing the impact to vary by birth cohort. The model specification is augmented by substituting the probability of being born after June 1935 with a series of variables reporting the probability of being in a specific birth cohort. For the main analysis, five birth cohorts are distinguished: AC 1 (eligibility age 60.5 to 61 years) to AC 5 (eligibility age is 64.5 to 65 years). This specification is given by
15 This assumption is consistent with birth registry data. Furthermore, payment record data confirm that the incidence of age pension receipt is uniform across month of birth. That is, there is no seasonality in the probability of pension receipt by month of birth. 16 As a further check, we considered restricting the sample to observations where the probability of misclassification is 0. Although the sample size decreases to one-half, our main results are entirely robust to this sample definition. Tables with the full set of results are available on request.
Specification (8) restricts the program reform to have a uniform impact across the age range 60 to 64 years. This assumption can be relaxed by permitting the treatment effect to vary by age within each birth cohort, which is feasible since the reform affects birth cohorts defined by eighteenmonth categories rather than single years. This more general specification is given by
This specification allows testing for reform impacts within cohorts at ages not directly targeted by the reform.
We also estimate the model for LFP separately for men and women using the specification
The coefficient δ jk measures the difference in the likelihood of being in the labor force for members of cohort AC k at age j relative to the control group that for this model corresponds to the pre-July 1935 cohorts, conditional on observed covariates. This is analogous to the specification and identification strategy Mastrobuoni (2009) used in studying the reform to the NRA in the United States. Since more recent cohorts of women face higher APAs, we expect increasing LFP at older ages for more recent cohorts. Estimating the model separately for men provides a placebo test of the reform and validity of the identification strategy underlying the difference-in-difference estimator. 17 Models (7) to (10) provide alternative estimators of the mean impact of the age pension reform on LFP. These treatment effect estimators do not take account of the age pension means test. The change in APA will not be binding on individuals who would fail to qualify due to the means test, which corresponds to almost 30% of the elderly population. To calculate the likelihood of receiving the age pension if counterfactually age eligible, 18 a linear probability model for the likelihood of receiving the age pension is estimated using 17 This specification also provides a robustness check of the common trend assumption of the difference-in-difference methodology. If our male and female groups experience different time trends or if our control group shows a decreasing or constant labor force participation trend while the female group shows an increasing participation trend, this will result in larger estimated effects than identified with the difference-in-difference strategy.
18 A simple rule of thumb is to rescale the estimated treatment effects by 1 0.7 = 1.43; however, this does not take account of potential differences in the mean probability of satisfying the means tests across birth cohorts due to differences, for example, in education attainment or home ownership status. the pooled IHCS sample of age-eligible individuals 19 with controls for marital status, education, location, home ownership status, house value, and household size. The estimated model is then used to predict the probability of individuals satisfying the means test and used to construct an estimate of the average effect of the change in APA on LFP conditional on satisfying the means test.
Specification (10) is also used to investigate potential program substitution impacts. Given that men and women exhibit different trends in participation in government programs (figures 4 and 5), the difference-in-difference strategy using men as a control group is less justified in this context. For this series of models, the dependent variable is an indicator of an individual's participation in any government program, any government program except the age pension, and the disability support pension program. The identification assumption is that after controlling the observable characteristics, cohort differences in the participation rates in government programs are driven by the APA reform. As a result, we expect to observe APA impacts on women's, and not on men's, participation. As for the analysis of LFP, estimating the treatment effect on participation in alternative programs with the male sample provides a placebo test of the identification strategy. Furthermore, if preexisting trends are the driving force of the cohort variation in women's program participation, then we are more likely to observe the effect at all ages rather than only at the ages directly affected by the reform.
IV. Results
A. Labor Force Participation
Single-treatment, regression-adjusted difference-in-difference estimates. Table 3 reports the regression-adjusted difference-in-difference estimates of the age pension reform impact on LFP. The model includes controls for age, education, marital status, state of residence, and household size. 20 Column 1 for the full sample shows that the coefficient on the after-cohort dummy variable is positive and significant and the coefficient on the treatment dummy variables (female) is significantly negative. The treatment effect estimate indicates an average increase in the probability of labor force participation by 7.7 percentage points across the post-June 1935 birth cohorts due to the reform. Given that an estimated 62.5% of the treated cohort would receive the age pension if age eligible, the treatment effect conditional on meeting the means test is a 12.3 percentage point increase in LFP.
Column 2 reports the model estimates for the sample of single men and women. The estimates show that the increase Linear probability model estimates for labor force participation based on pooled IHCS sample. All models include controls for age, educational attainment, state of residence, household size, and, for the full sample, marital status. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 999 replications, are in brackets. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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a The predicted probability of satisfying the means test is derived from a linear probability model for receipt of age pension benefits using the pooled IHCS sample of age-eligible individuals with controls for marital status, education, location, home ownership status, house value, and household size. The model estimates are used to predict the probability that individuals in the analysis sample satisfy the means test, which is then averaged over the post-July 1935 birth cohorts.
b The conditional treatment effect is equal to the unconditional treatment effect divided by the predicted probability of satisfying the means test.
in the APA increased the LFP of single women by 13.5 percentage points. With approximately 70% predicted to receive the age pension if age eligible, the estimated impact conditional on satisfying the means test is a 19.4 percentage point increase in LFP. The larger estimated treatment effect for singles in part reflects the fact that singles on average are more likely to satisfy the means test coupled with (a) the reform having a larger effect on the overall wealth of single women, inducing a larger LFP response, relative to married women or (b) potentially a cleaner control group based on the subsample of single adults.
Multiple treatments, regression-adjusted difference-indifference estimates. We consider the variation in treatment intensity and allow for multiple treatment groups by substituting the single-treatment indicator with five cohort dummy variables. If the wealth effect is the driver of the labor supply response, we expect to see a larger response by the younger cohorts who experience a larger decline in pension wealth. As an alternative, Mastrobuoni (2009) argues that the response may be more intense in the cohorts that have shorter notice and therefore have less margin to adjust their behavior to mitigate the wealth impact. By this reasoning, since younger cohorts are informed earlier relative to their prospective retirement date, they have more time to adjust their consumption and saving profile, and we may find a smaller LFP response of the more recent birth cohorts. Table 4 presents the results for the expanded specification, which allows for multiple treatments. We present the results for the full and singles samples, as well as two more restrictive subsamples. The model in column 3 restricts the singles sample to home owners who do not have mortgage debt, the main form of debt balances among Australian households. The model presented in column 4 is estimated on the sample of singles who are university graduates and, by virtue of their human capital, are likely to represent the segment of the population with highest lifetime income and personal wealth. We consider these two subsamples to assess if the APA reform has an impact on individuals who are least likely to be liquidity constrained.
From the results presented in table 4, first note that when we allow for heterogeneous impacts, the treatment effects of the APA changes are much more pronounced for the more recent cohorts. This finding is common to all the samples examined and is aligned with the magnitude of the wealth effect of the APA changes, contrary to the effect hypothesized by Mastrobuoni (2009) . A second feature of the results is that similar to the results in table 3, the magnitudes of the estimates are larger for the singles sample. Third, considering the estimates reported in columns 3 and 4, it is clear that the APA reform had a significant effect on subgroups that are less likely to be liquidity constrained. With the exception of the earliest cohort, which experienced the smallest reduction in social security wealth, all the treated cohorts increased their LFP similar to the magnitudes in column 2, particularly after correcting for differences in the expected probability of meeting the age pension means test. Although there is heterogeneity in the APA treatment intensity, the reform has a significant and comparable impact across groups with differing human capital and wealth levels.
There may be a remaining concern with the common trend assumption in our difference-in-difference empirical strategy. To further explore this issue, we follow the approach of Mastrobuoni (2009) and estimate specification (10) for the male and female samples separately. The coefficient estimates in table 5, columns 1 and 2, measure the difference in LFP between treated cohorts and the untreated cohort at the indicated age.
Two important patterns are revealed by the results shown in table 5. First, the male group treatment effect coefficients are generally small and statistically insignificant, although the set of 23 coefficients is jointly significant. The average estimated unconditional (conditional on meeting the age pension means test) response in LFP by men to a one-year increase in the APA at 0.004 (0.016) is clearly insignificant. The mixed Linear probability model estimates for labor force participation based on pooled IHCS sample. All models include controls for age, educational attainment, state of residence, household size, and, for the full sample, marital status. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 999 replications, are in brackets. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
a The predicted probability of satisfying the means test is derived from a linear probability model for receipt of age pension benefits using the pooled IHCS sample of age-eligible individuals with controls for marital status, education, location, home ownership status, house value, and household size. The model estimates are used to predict the probability that individuals in the analysis sample satisfy the means test, which is then averaged over the treated birth cohorts.
findings on the placebo effect-the joint significance largely due to the relatively high AC4 cohort effect, though small estimated average response-for men provides added support for the use of our preferred difference-in-difference identification strategy. Second, we see large and statistically significant positive effects for all postreform cohorts for the female sample. The increase in LFP for women is common to all ages and does not peak at the APA threshold. For example, the group of women faced with eligibility at ages 61.5 to 62 and 62.5 to 63 years shows an 11 percentage point increase in LFP at age 64. This somewhat puzzling result has been found in studies for other countries (Lumsdaine et al., 1999; Mastrobuoni, 2009) and has been rationalized as possibly due to the impact of the legislated APA on social norms, with the eventual APA forming a focal point for expected age of retirement. With further analysis of the IHCS data, we can eliminate calendar year or survey year instrument effects or mean differences in cohort characteristics, such as higher educational attainment or accumulated experience, as possible explanations. Accounting for the behavioral impact of the program change at ages beyond the target APA remains a fruitful area for further research. Linear probability model estimates for labor force participation based on pooled IHCS sample. All models include controls for age, educational attainment, state of residence, household size, and marital status. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 999 replications, are in brackets. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
a The total cohort impact is the sum of the treatment effects across the age categories for a cohort. b Estimate of mean impact across cohorts in response to a one-year increase in APA. c The predicted probability of satisfying the means test is derived from a linear probability model for receipt of age pension benefits using the pooled IHCS sample of age-eligible individuals with controls for marital status, education, location, home ownership status, house value, and household size. The model estimates are used to predict the probability that individuals in the analysis sample satisfy the means test, which is then averaged over the treated birth cohorts.
d The conditional treatment effect is equal to the unconditional treatment effect divided by the predicted probability of satisfying the means test.
To aid interpretation and provide comparability with the difference-in-difference results, we calculate the weighted average impact across cohorts: 
t).
This statistic, which is the average estimated response to a hypothetical one-year increase in the APA, is reported in the lower panel of table 5. We find that the APA changes on average led to an increase in LFP by 18 percentage points for the affected women (29 percentage points conditional on meeting the means test). 21 The results are actually larger than our difference-in-difference results presented in table 4 and further validate the identification strategy underlying the difference-in-difference framework.
The final, most comprehensive specifications allow for separate effects by age within cohorts based on the differencein-difference strategy. The results are presented in column 3 of table 5. The estimates are in line with the results in table 4 and columns 1 and 2 of table 5. The APA reform tended to have a greater impact on more recent cohorts, and the impact was greatest within cohorts at the ages directly targeted by the reform. The difference-in-difference estimates imply that a one-year increase in the APA on average induces a 12 percentage point increase in LFP (19 percentage points conditional on passing the means test). This point estimate is somewhat smaller than the single difference estimates in column 1 of table 5 due to general time trends reflected in the LFP of the male control group.
B. Government Program Substitution
Age pension reform may also lead women to enroll in other government programs that offer income replacement. To investigate this we use the specification in equation (10) and estimate models of program participation for men and women separately. Table 6 presents the estimates for dependent variables which indicate whether the individual participated in any government program, and in any government program other than the age pension. For men in the cohorts born after July 1935, the probability of participating in any government program is lower at all ages compared to men born before July 1935. The significant decline in receipt of government benefits is concentrated in cohorts AC3 to AC4, who also exhibited higher labor force participation. Examining the results for women, we see that the estimated decline in benefit receipt across all programs is even greater. Consistent with the mechanical impact of the age pension disentitlement, the decline in benefit receipt is most pronounced among women at ages that the APA reform directly affected. The estimates in column 3 are for participation in any government program apart from the age pension. These estimates highlight that the ages most affected by the reform were associated with substantial increases in participation in other government programs. For example, for the cohort where eligibility age increased from 60.5 to 61 years old, participation in other government programs increased by 15 percentage points at age 60. For the cohort with eligibility age 61.5 to 62 years, participation in other programs increased by 18 percentage point at age 60 and 13 percentage points at age 61. Furthermore, there are few significant 21 The robustness of the results was also checked by distinguishing ten separate treatment groups.The results are consistent with our findings in table 5: the sign and magnitudes stay the same as in our base specification, though some coefficients lose their statistical significance due to the reduction in the number of observations in several age-cohort cells. Tables containing the results for this specification are available in the working paper (Atalay & Barrett, 2012). increases in the probability of participation in other programs within cohorts after the APA threshold is reached, which further supports the previous finding that there is no common underlying trend driving women's program participation across cohorts. The variation in program participation rates by age across cohorts is aligned with the age pension reform.
In table 7, we focus specifically on participation in the DSP program. As described in section II, DSP is similar to the age pension in terms of funding, benefit structure, and means-tested eligibility, with the additional eligibility of requirement of being assessed as having a significant, long-term incapacity for work. The DSP program has the highest participation rate after the age pension in our sample. In table 7 we test whether individuals who face a higher APA are more likely to use the DSP as a substitute form of income support. Estimating this model on the male sample provides a placebo test for the identification strategy. A positive and significant placebo effect among men would indicate an underlying time trend in DSP participation. The results in table 7 are in line with the theoretical predictions. First, there is no placebo effect for men; the coefficient estimates are generally small, very close to 0, and statistically insignificant. For women, there is a significant increase in participation at ages directly targeted by the reform and no effect at other ages. The average treatment effect of the APA reform on DSP participation is approximately 13 percentage points (20 percentage points conditional on passing the means test), reported in the lower panel of table 7, and it is significantly larger for more recent birth cohorts over the affected ages. Column 3 of table 7 reports the results for the sample of single women, which again serves as a check on the robustness of the results to potential family spillover effects. The results are stronger among single adults compared to the base model with a 22.5 percentage point increase in DSP participation (32 percentage points conditional on passing the means test) in response to a hypothetical one-year increase in APA.
It is useful to consider the implications of the estimated impacts of the age pension reform on public expenditures. The ratcheting up of APA across the treatment birth cohorts mechanically reduced the Australian government's age pension expenditure liabilities for these cohorts over the age range 60 to 65 years by 55%. The disentitlement led to a 12 percentage point (19 percentage point conditional on satisfying the means test) increase in LFP. However, taking account of differences in treatment intensity and cohort responses, the APA change induced significant takeup of other program benefits. The substitution of DSP for age pension benefits alone reduced the implied net saving in pension expenditures to 26%. Accounting for all alternative income support programs reduces the net saving of benefit payments to 11%, or one-fifth of the mechanical reduction in benefit liabilities. This serves to highlight the importance of considering reforms to the age pension in the context of the broader income support system. Linear probability model estimates for participation in the disability support pension program based on pooled IHCS sample. All models include controls for age, educational attainment, state of residence, household size, and marital status. Bootstrapped standard errors, based on 999 replications, are in brackets. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
a The total cohort impact is the sum of the treatment effects across the age categories for a cohort. b Estimate of mean impact across cohorts in response to a one-year increase in APA. c The conditional treatment effect is equal to the unconditional treatment effect divided by the predicted probability of satisfying the means test. The mean predicted probability of satisfying the means test for each cohort is reported in table 5.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the 1993 Australian age pension reform, which increased the eligibility age for Australian women. In particular, the age pension age for women has increased from 60 years for women born prior to July 1935 by six-month increments for each subsequent eighteen-month birth cohort. The eligibility age will be equal to 65 years for women born after 1948. This change in eligibility age represents a decline in the social security wealth of the affected cohorts. Variation in the age pension eligibility age of adjacent cohorts of women, and in comparison to the constant eligibility age for men, provides a natural experiment for assessing the impact of the change in this key program parameter on retirement behavior. We use a difference-in-difference specification to exploit this reform and analyze the robustness of our result with respect to alternative model specifications and sample definitions.
We find economically significant responses to increases in the eligibility age for the age pension. An increase in the age pension eligibility age by one year induces a decline in retirement probability by 12 percentage points for women (19 percentage points conditional on meeting the means test). Furthermore, we find that the reform caused substantial program substitution. The rise in APA led to an increase in DSP enrollment by 13 to 23 percentage points (20 to 34 percentage points conditional on passing the means test), which exceeded the direct impact on labor force participation. Consequently, the overall reduction in public expenditure liabilities was substantially less than that implied by the mechanical age pension disentitlement.
There are several directions in which research on APA can be usefully extended. One is to better understand the reasons for APA reform impacts at ages beyond the target age and determine whether the effects operate through social norms, career job commitments, or other mechanisms. Another direction to examine further is the effect of social security reforms on joint decision making within families and how reforms affecting the entitlements of one family member affect the labor supply and program participation of his or her partner.
